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International airports are complex sociotechnical systems that have an intrinsic potential to 
develop safety and security disruptions. In the absence of appropriate defenses, and when the 
potential for disruption is neglected, organizational crises can occur and jeopardize aviation 
services. This investigation examines the ways in which modern international airports can be 
‘authors of their own misfortune’ by adopting practices, attitudes, and behaviors that could 
increase their overall level of vulnerability. A sociotechnical perspective, the macroergonomic 
approach, is applied in this research to detect the potential organizational determinants of 
vulnerability in airport operations. Qualitative data nurture the case study on international 
airports produced by the present research. Findings from this study highlight that systemic 
weaknesses frequently reside in areas at the intersection of physical, organizational, and social 
spaces. Specific pathways of vulnerability can be drawn across these areas, involving the 
following systemic layers: individual, task, tools and technology, environment, and 
organization. This investigation expands the existing literature on the dynamics that 
characterize crisis incubation in multi-organization, multi-stakeholder systems such as 
international airports and provides practical recommendations for airport managers to improve 
their capabilities to early-detect symptoms of organizational vulnerability. 
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SOCIAL MEDIA SUMMARY: 
Do we need a more holistic view on safety and security management in complex sociotechnical 
systems? This study paves the way to an epidemiology of safety and security risks in 
international airports. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, the International Air Transport Association projected that passengers worldwide 
will reach 7.2 billion by 2035, with an annual Compound Average Growth Rate of 3.7% 
(International Air Transport Association, 2014). Such demand for aviation services exerts 
remarkable pressure on the airport infrastructure, from a variety of stakeholders, whose 
interests often conflict. Indeed, compliance with safety and security regulations, economic 
goals, and time pressures coexist in the airport context and are managed by different actors, 
belonging to different organizations. Stemming from unintentional or intentional causes, safety 
and security risks have the potential to generate economic losses and, in the worst cases, human 
casualties in modern airports. The impact of disruptive safety and security occurrences is 
exacerbated by globalization, no-boundary attitudes, continuous flow of people and freight, 
and long-distance travel for leisure and work (Knox, O'Doherty, Vurdubakis, & Westrup, 
2008). From a safety viewpoint, the complexity of air transport makes the provision of adequate 
levels of safety a difficult task (Netjasov & Janic, 2008). Similarly, from a security perspective, 
the features of modern airports make them particularly attractive target for terrorists (Stewart 
& Mueller, 2014), as well as an asset that requires expensive protection strategies from airport 
organizations (Shafieezadeh, Cha, & Ellingwood, 2015; Stewart & Mueller, 2013).  
Airports can be described as large-scale sociotechnical systems made up of bounded 
work systems (e.g., arrival area, shops) acting as a unified whole (the airport infrastructure). 
Due to their complexity and size, modern airports can produce ‘dysfunctionality’ (Lalonde & 
Roux-Dufort, 2010, p. 22) or errors that can manifest as risks, service disruptions and, 
potentially, larger crises. Indeed, airports have a particular potential for the generation of 
vulnerability, especially through their routine managerial processes (e.g., management of labor 
intensive operations; high integration and engagement with customers’ groups; presence of 
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mixed components from both public and private sectors; increasing scale of operations over 
time; wide range of performed activities; etc.) (Smith, 2005).  
Despite their potential relevance, holistic studies on safety and security risks in airports 
are missing in the literature, which seems more prone to providing case-specific guidelines and 
solutions for managing such risks, rather than focusing on understanding their complexity 
(Nash et al., 2012). Two components are missing from the scholarly literature: holistic 
taxonomy of safety and security risks and an associated epidemiological study. 
The present study explores these caveats by attempting to establish a classification of 
safety and security risks and by laying the methodological foundations to investigate their 
epidemiology (Boyer & Pronovost, 2010), through the lens of pathways of vulnerability. 
2. REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
The conceptual framework adopted in the present paper sits at the intersection of four 
research areas: vulnerability, epidemiology of safety and security risks, vulnerability of airports 
to safety and security disruptions, and the macroergonomic approach (MeA) which looks at 
how systems work (or do not work) well together. 
2.1. Vulnerability 
Vulnerability was initially conceptualized in crisis and disaster management, with 
particular reference to social vulnerability of populations exposed to natural hazards (McEntire, 
2001). Researchers started investigating the concept of vulnerability in an attempt to respond 
to the traditional hazard-centric approach to crises (White, 1974), which reflects the 
conventional view on the concept of risk. According to this perspective, in the dichotomy 
between risk agent (the source of risk) and risk absorbing system (the object of the risk), the 
traditional, predominant focus of analysis is on the former (McEntire, Gilmore Crocker, & 
Peters, 2010). Hazards are therefore considered the main focus of investigation to understand 
how potential risks turn into actual crises. 
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However, empirical observations of crises highlight that hazards are not the only element 
to take into account in the case of adverse events (England, Agarwal, & Blockley, 2008). Low 
intensity hazards have the potential to initiate a chain reaction leading to major consequences. 
Conversely, high intensity hazards can have negligible impacts. An explanation of such an 
apparent contradiction resides in the risk absorbing system. Indeed, the relevance of operational 
risks is also determined by inherent characteristics of the subject threatened by a specific 
hazard, in a word, by its vulnerability (McEntire, 2004).  
Traditionally, three main stages characterize the theoretical development of vulnerability 
(Bouchon, 2006). First, vulnerability is considered from a technical perspective, as determined 
by the degree of loss and damages deriving from a hazard. Social dimensions of vulnerability 
are ignored. Second, vulnerability accounts for the degree of exposure to hazards, as reflected 
by loss and damages (Dow, 1992). Last, vulnerability refers to the internal characteristics of 
the element at risk (Lewis, 1999), where loss and damage become a function of the resistance 
capacity of the technical system. Similarly, from a social perspective, they become a function 
of the resilience capacity of the considered human system (Bouchon, 2006). This last stage 
adopts a sociotechnical approach in assessing vulnerability and accounts for social factors as 
well as more traditional technical factors.  
The developmental notion of vulnerability can further be summarized in two main 
categories (Bouchon, 2006), which constitute its basic ontology. First, hazard-dependent 
vulnerability is determined by the amount of damage experienced by a system after being 
affected by a hazard. Vulnerability is mainly interpreted as an indicator of outcome. Second, 
hazard-independent vulnerability is determined by the internal state of a system, regardless of 
external hazards. Vulnerability is predominantly interpreted as an indicator of input.  
From an epistemological perspective, vulnerability can be conceived as a conceptual 
cluster (Füssel, 2007, p. 156) and be investigated based on the specific context (e.g., economy, 
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ecology and sociology). According to this approach, knowledge of the concept of vulnerability 
is impossible if isolated from its specific context. Vulnerability can also be explored based on 
the nature of the object of vulnerability. This implies isolating vulnerability from its context 
and focusing on the characteristics of the vulnerable system (e.g., individual vulnerability, 
organizational vulnerability and infrastructural vulnerability). Knowledge of the concept of 
vulnerability is possible regardless of its context. 
According to the adopted ontological and epistemological postures, research on 
vulnerability can be positioned in any of the quadrants of the following matrix (Fig. 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The present research conducts a hazard-independent assessment of organizational 
vulnerability to safety and security risks, with international airports as object of vulnerability1. 
                                                          
1 As discussed, adopting a hazard-independent approach entails significant analytical benefits. However, we 
acknowledge its incongruity with traditional public response to hazards, which is mainly hazard-specific. 
Further research is needed in this area. We thank an anonymous reviewer for remarking this.  
Amount of physical damages caused 
by a coastal hurricane; 
 
Magnitude of financial losses 
deriving from economic turmoil; 
 
Extent of social damages produced 
by an epidemic on a given 
population; 
 
Etc. 
 
Losses deriving from a terrorist 
attack in a major airport; 
 
Impact of stress agents on the 
performance of an individual; 
 
Lost reputation from sabotage 
perpetrated to an organisation; 
 
Etc. 
 
Degree of sensitivity of a population 
to climate change-related issues; 
 
Resistance of a small economy 
subject to financial constraints; 
 
Capacity to internally develop 
conditions for political crisis; 
 
Etc. 
Managerial factors increasing the 
chances for crises to occur; 
 
Technical faults in a power plant 
possibly leading to accidents; 
 
Individual ability to resist to, and 
recover from, conditions of physical 
incapacitation; 
 
Etc. 
Context        Object of Vulnerability  
Epistemological focus 
Hazard-
Dependent 
Hazard-
Independent 
Ontological 
focus 
Fig.  1. Conceptual frameworks to investigate vulnerability with practical examples and focus of the 
present research (grey area) 
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This means focusing on the airport as the risk absorbing system, regardless of the potential risk 
agents (e.g., a disgruntled operator or a violent storm). Vulnerability is considered as an input 
factor (e.g., as a function of the solidity of the external perimeter fence) and not as an outcome 
measure (e.g., as the economic loss deriving from weather-related flight cancellations). This 
study aims at expanding our understanding of determinants of safety and security risks, with a 
view to lay the foundations for their epidemiology (Boyer & Pronovost, 2010), in modern 
international airports.  
2.2. Toward an epidemiology of safety and security risks: pathways of vulnerability 
Prior research has highlighted that determinants of vulnerability rarely act in isolation 
(Turner, 1976; Turner & Pidgeon, 1978). The concept of pathways of vulnerability (Drennan, 
McConnell, & Stark, 2014; Kraemer, Carayon, & Clem, 2009; Smith, 2004, 2005) suggests 
that vulnerability develops through corridors that have the potential to lead to specific 
disruptions in normal business operations. Accordingly, in a study on the organizational 
determinants of vulnerability, the identification of such determinants (classification) is as 
important as the comprehension of the ways in which these determinants align and interact 
(analysis).  
In pioneering work on the epidemiology of crises, Reason (1990) described the initial 
stages of crises as a set of latent conditions that develop through managerial practices. These 
conditions usually take the form of embedded ‘failure pathways’ (Smith, 2005, p. 314), which 
reside in organizational processes and procedures. As such, managerial functions have a major 
role in crisis incubation, although this is often neglected in the literature (Smith, 2005). At an 
initial stage, decisions made at the managerial level can create the conditions for organizational 
controls to be by-passed (Carayon et al., 2006; Smith, 1990a, 1990b, 1995). In airports, an 
example of this can be the habit of staff members to leave security doors open behind them to 
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facilitate transit to, and from, the sterile area. This may constitute a latent antecedent for a 
potential risk to become an organizational crisis. 
The literature presents a range of papers that explore the concept of pathways of 
vulnerability in various domains. In their work on food supply chains, Stave and Kopainsky 
(2015) adopt a system dynamics approach to unveil the mechanisms and pathways by which 
food systems can be affected by disturbances. Findings demonstrate that vulnerability of a 
national food system does not only result from external shocks, but also from the internal 
interaction of feedback loops in the food system. The authors recommend that future research 
be focused on exploring internal threats of food supply stability. Kraemer, Carayon and Clem 
(2009) assess the human and organizational factors that can be responsible for technical 
vulnerabilities in the field of Information and Communication Technologies. This study 
illustrates an original taxonomy of four different categories of vulnerability: design, 
implementation, configuration, and operational. Furthermore, it produces a classification of 
contributing human and organizational factors (e.g., external influences, human error, 
management, etc.). Through causal network analysis, the researchers associate the different 
categories of vulnerability with the identified factors. Findings underline that human and 
organizational factors contribute to the creation of a single pathway of vulnerability (Kraemer 
et al., 2009). Two pathways that have the potential to lead to organizational crises in public 
agencies have been identified by Drennan, McConnell, and Stark (2014). The first pathway is 
characterized by a slow incubation process, in which crises’ determinants are internally 
developed. The second pathway, typical of events such as natural disasters, involves a sudden 
trigger that, by leveraging a pre-existing condition of vulnerability in the affected system, 
unleashes a crisis. Regardless of the typology of involved pathway, crises are mainly caused 
by failures in one or more of the following elements: human behavior, technology, management 
systems, and government behavior. Smith (2000, 2004, 2005) argues that vulnerability 
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develops in modern organizations throughout the crisis life-cycle. By conducting an external 
audit, pathways of vulnerability can be identified and used as the basis for crisis simulation 
exercises. The author recommends this procedure as a way to highlight the assumptions and 
beliefs that underlie the organizational life and as a first step towards the diffusion of a crisis-
prepared organizational culture.  
Several points are critical relating to pathways of vulnerability research. First, 
organizational disruptions are rarely the result of a unique determinant, often originating from 
the interplay of different co-factors. Second, regardless of the field of investigation, the concept 
of pathways of vulnerability provides an interpretation of the aforementioned interplay. Third, 
as the nature and number of co-determinants for organizational disruptions varies, a holistic 
perspective is deemed to be the most appropriate in order to gauge their origins. Last, the 
comprehension of pathways of vulnerability is deemed to constitute a crucial element in the 
diffusion of a crisis-prepared organizational culture.  
2.3. Vulnerability of airports to safety and security disruptions 
Research investigating airports’ vulnerability to safety and security risks is scarce and 
mainly adopts a hazard-dependent approach (Fig. 1). This entails a focus on the triggering 
factors, for instance the patterns followed by extreme meteorological events around airports, 
(Lopez, 2016) or the behaviors enacted by Improvised Explosive Devices attackers (Lord, 
Nunes-Vaz, Filinkov, & Crane, 2010), rather than on the underlying organizational factors that 
contribute to the disruptive events. A notable exception to the prevalent hazard-dependent 
approach is represented by Pettersen and Bjornskau (2015), who investigate the organizational 
contradictions between aviation safety and airport security following the introduction, in 
Europe, of new security regulations. The misalignment between safety and security measures 
is indicated as a source of systemic vulnerability in aviation organizations. Admittedly: 
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Studies that address the relationship between flight safety and aviation security from an 
organizational perspective, focusing on […] organizational structure, culture, and 
power, seem to be lacking. (Pettersen & Bjørnskau, 2015, p. 168). 
 
The overwhelming majority of the literature on airport vulnerability reveals two distinct 
foci: safety or security issues. Among the most recent examples in the area of airport 
vulnerability to safety disruptions, the consequences of climate change (e.g., variation in wind 
directions, increase in temperatures, etc.) have been investigated by means of a hazard-
dependent approach focused on the airport physical infrastructure (Lopez, 2016). An integrated 
hazard-dependent and hazard-independent approach is adopted by Li and Xu (2015), who 
propose a method to help air traffic administrations schedule airport maintenance to avoid 
safety concerns and service disruptions. Vulnerability is assessed based on the structural 
characteristics of the explored airports (nature of the object of vulnerability) and on the specific 
hazard (maintenance risks). However, no reference to managerial and organizational 
vulnerability factors is made. Similarly, Anh Tran and Namatame (2015) provide a model of 
the worldwide aviation network to illustrate its typical spatial characteristics. This allows the 
researchers to highlight the responses of the network to extreme events (hazard-dependent 
vulnerability analysis) and produce practical recommendations on how to improve such 
responses.  
In general, the literature on models for airport security threat assessment adopts a 
combined hazard-dependent and hazard-independent perspective. Assessment of security risks 
(e.g., terrorism) is conducted considering both the characteristics of the airports (e.g., physical 
layout, security defenses, etc.) and the intentions or capabilities of the attackers. In their study 
on the sequential decision framework of attackers to a US airport, Shafieezadeh, Cha and 
Ellingwood (Shafieezadeh et al., 2015) assess the vulnerability of the airport’s security systems 
based on the progressive decisions made by the attackers and calculate the likely losses for the 
airport according to whether the attack was successful, partially successful or unsuccessful. 
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However, an exploration of the intrinsic, organizational factors that impact the security 
performance of the airport lies outside the scope of the research. 
The work by Lord et al. (2010) segments the airport in sub-components and elaborate a 
probabilistic model to assess the risks associated with an Improvised Explosive Device attack. 
This investigation considers vulnerability from a hazard-dependent perspective and revolves 
around the nature of the object of vulnerability. This study depicts a series of scenarios, in 
which the physical features of the front-of-house (e.g., size) and a number of mitigating factors 
(e.g., presence of threat detection systems) impact on the extent of the associated security risks. 
Overall, there is a notable scarcity of studies adopting a hazard-independent approach to 
investigate vulnerability. The present paper is intended to fill this gap. The definition of 
vulnerability underlying this paper is borrowed from Kraemer, Carayon and Clem who 
consider vulnerability as the result of 'flawed organizational policies and individual practices 
whose origins are deeply rooted within early design assumptions and managerial decisions' 
(2009, p. 510). This definition addresses a call in the literature that recommends assessing 
vulnerability based on the reality of human behavior within the organizational context of 
reference (management). According to the aforementioned definition, four elements are 
deemed to be key constituents of organizational vulnerability: organizational policies, 
individual practices, early design assumptions, and managerial decisions. These elements are 
mirrored in the Macroergonomic Approach (MeA) (Kraemer et al., 2009), which is a holistic 
framework for sociotechnical systems analysis that focuses on organizational characteristics 
and design of complex work systems (such as airports). As the sociotechnical framework that 
most closely explores the human-organization interface (Carayon & Smith, 2000; Hendrick & 
Kleiner, 2001; Kraemer et al., 2009), the MeA is utilized in the present research to investigate 
the vulnerability of airport operations. 
2.4. Macroergonomic approach 
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Originating in the human factors and ergonomics mainframe, the MeA explores human 
performance and its limitations in the context of a specific sociotechnical system. In human 
factors and ergonomics, the relationship between human and system components occurs on 
five levels: human-machine (hardware ergonomics); human-environment (environmental 
ergonomics); human-software (cognitive ergonomics); human-job (work-design ergonomics); 
and human-organization (macroergonomics) (Hendrick, 1998; Hendrick & Kleiner, 2001, 
2002). 
The MeA has been identified as a ‘top-down sociotechnical systems approach to the 
design of work systems’ (Hendrick & Kleiner, 2002, p. 3). The MeA adopts a holistic approach 
in which the organizational design influences the human performance. Decisions made at the 
macro-level (the organization) are a pre-requisite for decisions made at the micro-level (the 
workstation). The perspective adopted by the MeA is syncretic in that it encompasses 
knowledge originating from a variety of research areas: sociotechnical systems, organizational 
psychology and human factors and ergonomics (Murphy, Robertson, & Carayon, 2014). The 
MeA elevates the traditional focus on work design and reaches out to higher systemic levels 
by describing sociotechnical systems as constituted by the sub-components depicted in Table 
I (Carayon & Smith, 2000; Kraemer et al., 2009). 
Table I. Components of the MeA 
MeA component Examples 
Individual Physical status of operators, psychological conditions, skills 
Task Work pressure, job content, job control 
Tools & Technology Tools utilized during work duties 
Environment Workplace layout, noise levels, air quality 
Organization: communication Information-sharing arrangements 
Organization: culture Organizational values and behaviors 
Organization: policy Regulations, policies, guidelines 
Organization: structure Governance mechanisms 
Organization: implementation Application of organizational policies 
Organization: strategy Long-term organizational goals 
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Under certain conditions, the interplay among the aforementioned components can create 
systemic vulnerability. This interplay is shaped along specific patterns, or pathways of 
vulnerability (Kraemer et al., 2009).  
3. RESEARCH METHODS 
The present study, conducted in three airports in Australia, aimed at identifying potential 
organizational determinants of vulnerability to safety and security disruptions in international 
airports, by investigating the perceptions that airport actors have around safety and security 
risks. Due to the exploratory nature of the research (Babbie, 2013), we adopted a qualitative 
methodology (single case study). Despite the numerous organizations involved in airport 
operations, this research focused on the airport management functions executed by the airport 
operator. As an organization, airport management is the focal point of airports and sits at the 
intersection of the sociotechnical complexity of the airports. 
We conducted 30 semi-structured interviews (12 in Airport A, 8 in Airport B and 10 in 
Airport C), analyzed 37 organizational documents (14 in Airport A, 16 in Airport B and 7 in 
Airport C) and spent around 21 hours in field observation (approx. 7 hours per airport). Data 
were predominantly drawn from the interviews (which revolved around participants’ 
perceptions of safety and security risks), with document analysis and field observation as 
complementary methods.  
3.1. Data collection methods 
Key contacts in each airport identified interviewees who could provide insightful 
information. The selection of respondents followed a purposeful sampling technique (Patton, 
2002) where the sample was categorized into four units of analysis: leadership level (LL) which 
included the general managers; corporate management level (CML) including the corporate 
managers reporting to the general managers; operational management level (OML) including 
operational managers reporting to the corporate managers; and managers from the security 
screening providers together with the Australian Federal Police (SSP/AFP), due to their 
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interconnectedness with airport security. The sample was further classified according to the 
areas of operations of the interviewees: landside managers (LS) responsible for terminals and 
annexes, airside (AS) managers predominantly dealing with tarmac operations, and 
landside/airside managers (LS/AS) with mixed functions. Table II illustrates the sample 
adopted for the semi-structured interviews. 
Table II: Sample for the semi-structured interviews 
Unit of Analysis 
Area of Operations 
Landside Landside/Airside Airside TOTAL 
Leadership Level - 3 - 3 
Corporate Management Level 3 4 3 10 
Operational Management Level 2 7 3 12 
SSP/AFP 5 - - 5 
TOTAL 10 14 6 30 
Note: SSP/AFP = Security Service Providers/Australian Federal Police 
Respondents agreed to have their interviews audio-recorded, except two cases where 
detailed notes were taken. Examples of questions asked during the interviews included: ‘What 
are the most common safety and security risks to normal business operations that could 
manifest in your area of operations?’ and ‘What factors could contribute in generating these 
safety and security risks, and how?’  
Document analysis included investigation of organizational documents (e.g., incident 
identification and investigation reports, risk assessment plans, etc.). Besides, field observation 
helped the researchers make sense of airport processes, practices, and structures (Knox et al., 
2008), and was conducted in a hanging around form (Marshall & Rossman, 2011) in the three 
data collection sites. This included terminal walk-throughs and airside and security checkpoints 
inspections. Field notes were taken with a focus on impersonal elements such as airport layout, 
design, and organizational processes (Punch, 2012). 
3.2. Data analysis 
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Data were coded using qualitative data analysis software (QSR International’s NVivo 
10). The first level of analysis of the organizational determinants of vulnerability was based on 
the categories proposed by the MeA. Recurring sub-themes were identified in the second level 
of data analysis.  
An inter-rater test of reliability of the coding criteria was conducted on different excerpts 
of the semi-structured interviews. The resulting kappa coefficient was greater than 0.81 for all 
the coded excerpts (0.81 to 0.94), which indicates almost perfect agreement (Landis & Koch, 
1977). Overall, 84 excerpts were compared, equally extracted from interviews in the three 
airports. These tests confirmed the reliability of the adopted frameworks for coding and data 
analysis. 
4. RESULTS 
In the interviews, the first set of questions revolved around the safety and security risks 
that respondents reputed the most relevant. This component of the study was intended to gain 
a better understanding of the perceptions existing among airport organizations with regards to 
their most significant risks. Saturation was achieved across the three aerodromes. Table III 
describes the safety and security risks indicated in the 30 semi-structured interviews, ranking 
them by frequency. It is worth further stressing that such risks are not actual events occurred 
in the airports, but potential instances whose frequency is calculated as percentage of 
participants referring to them in the interviews. 
Table III: Safety and security risks 
Disruption Description Freq. (%) 
Landside security 
breaches 
The integrity of the sterile area can potentially be 
compromised by access of unscreened individuals. Instances 
include: unscreened passengers, passengers in transit from 
unscreened airports, pass-back doors violations, etc. 
63.3% 
Congestion and 
queuing 
Disturbances generated by reduced functionality in airport 
operations (e.g., check-in and security screening) which 
result in congestion at the airport facilities.  
46.7% 
Ramp safety issues Workplace health and safety-related events (WHS) during 
airside operations in airports’ ramp (apron), including: 
40% 
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mismanagement of ground service equipment, speed limit 
violations on the ramp, driving behind pushbacks, etc.  
Disruptive 
behaviors by 
passengers and 
general public 
Passengers or members of the general public displaying 
disruptive behaviors. Instances include: refusal to undergo 
screening, hostile attitude, hoaxes, and criminal activity.  
40% 
Landside safety 
events 
WHS occurrences affecting passengers, general public, or 
staff members in the landside area. Instances include: 
escalator falls, slips, trips and falls in the terminals, etc. 
36.7% 
Airside breaches Security-related violations of the airside area. Instances 
include: access by wandering passengers, access control 
breaches by staff members, and external perimeter 
violations. 
36.7% 
Prohibited items 
violations 
The intentional or unintentional introduction of items 
prohibited under current regulations into the sterile area of 
the airport. 
36.7% 
Technical failures Disruptions in the functionality of technical assets in any of 
the airports’ subsystems. Instances include failures to: IT 
systems, equipment, infrastructure, and aircrafts.  
33.3% 
Bird and wildlife 
management 
Issues with the control of the wildlife living within and in 
the vicinity of the aerodromes. Bird-strikes represent the 
most significant of these instances. 
26.7% 
Natural hazards These instances range from adverse weather conditions to 
calamitous natural events whose consequences can be minor 
or catastrophic.   
26.7% 
Unattended items Personal items left unattended in the airport facilities. 
Instances include: unattended suitcases, working tools, 
boxes, etc. 
26.7% 
Fire alarms Activation of fire alarms disrupting the normal airport 
operations (false alarms or fire events). 
23.3% 
Aircraft 
emergencies 
Aircrafts experiencing issues when landing, parking, taxing 
or taking off. 
20% 
Maintenance, works 
and repairs 
Extraordinary interventions on the airport infrastructure that 
have the potential to alter the normal flow of operations or 
entail safety issues. 
20% 
Traffic management 
front-of-house 
Ancillary transportation services to and from the airport 
(parking, taxis, buses, trains) potentially jeopardized by 
service disturbances. 
13.3% 
 
Data revealed that safety and security risks escape strict classification. Each airport 
operator had a different methodology to collect, report and classify potential safety or security 
disturbances to their operations. One example was represented by the incident reporting 
systems utilized in the three airports, which ranged from statistical recollections of numerical 
values to detailed descriptions of events. Data revealed that these risks have different 
characteristics, according to their circumstances (e.g., the various types of potential aircraft 
emergencies); incubate and manifest in specific areas of operations; in extreme cases could 
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impact the whole airport or the national/global aviation network; could involve multiple actors 
from different organizations (public and private); and in cases of particular relevance, could 
affect the organization across the functional and hierarchical levels (e.g., units of analysis). 
4.1. Macroergonomic factors of vulnerability 
A total of 883 excerpts were coded around the 10 MeA categories. Table IV displays the 
MeA categories, sub-categories, their description and illustrative quotes from the interviews. 
Sub-categories constitute a novelty in the literature, as we elaborated them based on the most 
recurring themes that we identified within each MeA category. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
Table IV. Macroergonomic factors, sub-categories and sample quotations 
Macroergonomic 
factors 
Sub-categories Description Sample quotations 
Individual Complacency Sub-optimal level of attention in 
operators due to reduced activity  
‘Are [the security screeners] feeling involved in what they're doing? Not always.  
Not so much out on the inspection points, where it's a bit monotonous.’ (SSP/AFP-
LS) 
 Stress Psychological adverse state caused in 
operators by high levels of stress 
‘“Look, I'm splitting up with my wife. My head isn’t in the space.” So, I go, “Okay, 
we’re not gonna put you on operation screening. We’re gonna put you somewhere 
else.” So, in this way you’re mitigating the risk by removing it.’ (SSP/AFP-LS) 
 Lack of skills Inadequate physical or psychological 
skills by operators in performing their 
duties 
‘Sometimes some of the screening staff are not as skilled as they need to be in 
understanding the diversity of the people.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
 Limited 
experience 
Background experience of safety and 
security operators crucial in 
determining their performance 
‘[Some ground handlers] are not quite getting the experience out there that they 
should. Some companies used to wait six months before they let some drive out 
there, whereas now, almost two weeks, they’re trying to get them out there driving.’ 
(CML-AS) 
Task Task 
repetitiveness 
Monotonous tasks following the same 
pattern may cause complacency in 
operators 
‘Usually the reason why the guys miss [prohibited items during baggage screening], 
is because they're just tired, or they're looking at hundreds of bags every day. Not 
expecting it.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
 Stressful tasks Bounded by time constraints, 
operators may pay less attention to 
safety and security 
‘[Ground handlers] need to rush, rush, rush. They’ll run all over the place. […] On 
time performance sort of affects people’s behavior, speeding and stuff like that.’ 
(CML-AS) 
Tools and Technology Landside Non state-of-the-art equipment 
(hardware and software) affecting 
safety and security performance  
‘I know at the domestic terminal they are looking at the [screening process] with the 
single view x-rays, but there’s much better technology out there which we currently 
use at the international points transit.’ (SSP/AFP-LS) 
 Airside Need to constantly improve safety 
equipment to reduce risks Airside 
‘We're currently looking at new equipment for bird dispersal and that sort of stuff. So 
yes, there's an area there where we're lacking because of the other side.’ (OML-AS) 
Environment Landside Certain elements associated with the 
physical layout of terminals may 
produce sub-optimal safety and 
security 
‘It's part of the whole design of where you've got departing and arriving mixing at 
those peak times. He's not the first person to have fallen over someone else's bag 
because of that interaction or that chaos that you sometimes...’ (OML-LS/AS) 
 Landside/Airside Sterile areas and transit points design 
have an impact on the performance at 
the screening points 
‘[The separation between international and domestic terminals] makes it much more 
complex for the passenger in terms of transits, and also for levels of screening. So, 
we might have certain level of screening for one terminal that’s not the same for the 
others.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
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Macroergonomic 
factors 
Sub-categories Description Sample quotations 
 Airside Layout of external facilities may make 
Airside areas crowded 
‘Aircraft parking restraints in terms of the amount of bays we’ve got and stuff like 
that. We’ll have some squeezy times, so, our morning peak is the killer but I think it’s 
a common problem around a lot of the airports around Australia.’ (CML/AS) 
Organizational: 
Communication 
Internal Gap between the safety and security 
functional areas in terms of 
communication 
‘I actually think that the Airside safety team is better linked into the business than the 
security team. The security team, sort of, sit out on their own, they’re isolated. They’re 
not integrated into the business, they think it’s some secret stuff, but it’s not a secret.’ 
(CML-LS/AS) 
 Systemic Some governmental agencies may be 
reticent in sharing information with 
airport management 
‘The government agencies are a little bit different because of their clearances and 
because of our clearances. So, they're not allowed to share certain information to 
private industry. So, there's a bit of disconnect there. It's just an old methodology 
again.’ (OML-LS) 
 External Sub-optimal communication between 
airport organizations and passengers or 
general public 
‘The public really even to this day, still don’t know what they can and can’t bring 
through, because nobody checks the government websites and you can put out as 
much information out at the front of the screen and point, nobody reads signs, nobody 
listens to videos.’ (SSP/AFP-LS) 
Organizational: 
Culture 
Culture Organizational cultures may diffuse 
complacency, inadequate information 
sharing and gaps between safety and 
security functions  
‘The guys doing safety on the apron, they are very aware of the arena they are 
working on, which is very complex. Safety, safety, safety…excellent. Security guys, on 
the other hand, I sometimes wonder if they really know what their role is.’ (LL-LS/AS) 
 Training Training effectiveness may clash with 
cost savings by airport organizations 
‘How do you ensure that airlines have got the right training, processes, and 
procedures in place? You’re dealing with the low cost model and their contractors 
and that can be difficult.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
Organizational: Policy Safety Due to its nature, safety may be 
difficult to regiment and open to 
interpretation 
‘Because here, you know, in some areas the Manual of Standards will say aerodrome 
operators “should” do this.  Well, that’s not a “must” or “shouldn’t” and then you’d 
find a paragraph here that says do this, but this other paragraph completely 
opposite.’ (CML-AS) 
 Security Security can be perceived as a non-
natural process, which may lead to 
sub-optimal performance 
‘Security's not a natural process. If I said to you “Don't leave your bag unattended 
and remove all your wooden artefacts and don't have a plastic knife.” You'd go, 
“Really?” So, it's not ingrained process. It's not a process that everyone does through 
life.’ (OML-LS) 
Organizational: 
Structure 
Rostering Under-staffing caused by the low cost 
business model may impact the safety 
and security performance 
‘Staffing level is probably a lot less. The ground handling companies probably don’t 
have as many staff as they could. I mean they got minimal staff. You often have issues 
when you wanna move aircrafts at night because they haven’t got staff around or 
available. So, they’re not rostered on.’ (CML-AS) 
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Macroergonomic 
factors 
Sub-categories Description Sample quotations 
 Contracts Complex contractual arrangements 
may reduce the effectiveness of 
controls by airport management on 
other organizations 
‘Especially in the case of low cost carriers, they are under contractors. To me, that 
adds another barrier or ownership of the issue. My hands are tied. It doesn’t help 
facilitate that ownership of the customer service issue. I believe there is more of a 
discharge of responsibility.’ (CML-LS) 
Organizational: 
Implementation 
Security screening Security operators may inadequately 
implement screening procedures 
‘It comes back to an appreciation of the behaviors of people and not putting 
everybody into one box and understanding the diversity of the makeup of your 
travelling public.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
 Training During training, excessive focus on 
screening procedures than on reasons 
for screening 
‘Sometimes we train too much on the procedures but then, when I ask the guys “Why 
are you screening?”, they don’t know, so I would like to have more training on why 
we do screening in airports.’ (SSP/AFP) 
 Cost reduction Implementation of a real low cost 
model may impact the performance of 
operators 
‘Whereas, I guess five years ago, the low cost carriers weren’t really low cost, I guess 
that they weren’t really operating that true low cost model. They’d say: “We just 
waiver the excess baggage fee and that’s okay”, or whatever that be. It’s a change in 
their operating models of the airlines that’s kind of having a follow on to airports as 
such.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
Organizational: 
Strategy 
Low cost business 
model 
Pressure on the achievement of 
economic goals may be detrimental to 
safety and security 
‘You know, airlines are all about on time performance, so that puts pressure on their 
staff straightaway. They just want passengers on the seats. As long as they can get 
their seats, they're happy.’ (OML-LS) 
 Competition Economic competition may suggest 
airport organizations to put in place 
strategic behaviors potentially 
detrimental to safety and security  
‘So, at the moment, the decision to cease operations in case of natural hazards has to 
be through consultation, negotiation and that can sometimes be difficult, because 
airlines are competitive by nature. Neither one of them wants to stop operating before 
the other one does and that will put…their risk cap type is a lot different.’ (CML-LS) 
 Stakeholder 
networks 
Airport management may be caught in 
the middle in the airport’s stakeholder 
network  
‘The airports are the ones that I guess are in a really quite precarious situation, 
because they have to go back to the regulators. Then you’ve got your airlines that, as 
we said, they all do things slightly differently, but then how as an airport can you 
manage that?’ (OML-LS) 
Note: CML = Corporate Management Level; OML = Operational Management Level; SSP/AFP = Security Service Providers/Australian Federal Police; LS = Landside; As = 
Airside.  
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The four units of analysis (LL, CML, OML, and SSP/AFP) were expected to enable 
identification of recurring nodes within the hierarchical level of the respondents. Results 
demonstrated that no significant trend could be singled out by analyzing the units of analysis 
as a mediator of the organizational factors for vulnerability. Nonetheless, some patterns seemed 
to emerge by looking at the areas of operation where the data originated (landside, airside and 
landside/airside). Interviewees mainly involved in LS operations underlined the importance of 
security-related factors; managers primarily operating AS emphasized the importance of 
safety-related factors; and a mixed perspective was provided by data drawn from the combined 
LS/AS areas of operation. 
Data also revealed that the factors of vulnerability do not act in isolation, but constantly 
interact and influence each other, as multiple layers potentially producing pathways of 
vulnerability. This supports existing literature on this topic (Kraemer et al., 2009; Smith, 2004, 
2005). We drew these mutual connections as they were emphasized by the respondents in the 
semi-structured interviews, and linked them with the safety and security risks that we had 
previously underlined. 
An example of this were the Airside security breaches (Fig. 2), a category of security 
disruptions potentially deriving from a combination of individual (complacency by operators), 
task (task repetitiveness), environmental (design of LS/AS transit points), and cultural factors 
(an organizational culture of complacency towards, for instance, security doors left open by 
staff members). 
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Macroergonomic 
factors 
Airside Security Breaches 
Individual  Complacency 
(Security screeners 
and operators) 
  
Task  Task repetitiveness 
(Transit point 
screeners) 
  
Tools&Tech.     
Environment  LS/AS: Transit point 
design 
(Monotonous and 
isolated) 
 AS: General 
Aviation (Presence 
of GA and location 
separated from the 
main terminal 
buildings) 
Communication     
Culture Security culture: 
complacency (staff 
leaving security 
doors open) 
   
Policy    Security Policy: 
General Aviation 
(Different security 
requirements) 
Structure   Rostering (Reduced 
airline staff at 
security doors) 
 
Implementation     
Strategy   Competition 
(Airlines) 
 
Fig. 2. An example of a potential pathway of vulnerability 
Our findings demonstrate that the concept of pathways of vulnerability can be fruitfully 
applied to different sociotechnical systems, in order to provide insights on how specific safety 
and security risks may incubate and manifest. After further research in this field of study, 
theoretical frameworks for a diagnostic assessment of pathways of vulnerability can be 
elaborated. 
4.2. Risk assessment frameworks in the three airports 
 During document analysis, we reviewed the risk assessment documents of the three 
airports. The review highlighted that in the three aerodromes safety and security risks are 
identified, assessed and treated in different ways based on their likelihood (ranging from 1, the 
lowest, to 5, the highest) and consequences (from E, the lowest, to A, the highest).  
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As an example, in Airport X2, a rare event was considered to occur once in 10 years; in 
Airport Y, less than once in 100 years; and in Airport Z, once in 20 or more years. Similarly, 
in Airport X, a major event was classified as causing major impact on operations; in Airport 
Y, economic loss between $4.5M and $18M; and in Airport Z, economic loss between $10M 
and $30M. Furthermore, Airport X had three categories of risk rating (and, consequentially, of 
strategies for intervention), while Airport Y and Airport Z had four (with different definitions). 
In addition, the examined risk entries had different names and definitions in the three airports 
and several risks were classified in certain airports, and not in others. The risk assessment 
matrices originating from this taxonomy of operational risks were in turn different and entailed 
a non-harmonized classification of risk ratings, as depicted in Fig. 3. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
                                                          
2 The three airports are randomly indicated as X, Y, and Z to further protect their identity. 
 
Fig. 3. Risk assessment matrices in the three airports 
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5. DISCUSSION 
This research has adopted a hazard-independent approach to organizational vulnerability, 
encompassing safety as well as security risks as potentially originating from airport operations. 
This expands the existing literature, which mainly adopts a hazard-dependent approach. Our 
focus was on the characteristics of the object of vulnerability (the airports), regardless of the 
context, a perspective rarely adopted in the literature. In defining the overall level of 
vulnerability, we considered the crucial role of the interaction between the human (individual 
level) and the systemic features (organizational level) of airports. 
This study has emphasized that multiple triggers of vulnerability stem from the 10 MeA 
categories: individual, task, tools and technology, environment, and organization 
(communication, culture, policy, structure, implementation, and strategy). Supporting existing 
studies (Drennan et al., 2014; Smith, 2004, 2005), our results revealed the potential for these 
factors to converge along preferential development corridors, where one or more features can 
generate another one (or others) until impacting individuals’ performance and ultimately 
creating conditions for safety and security risks to materialize. An example of this were the 
airside breaches – representing a type of security risk potentially deriving from a combination 
of individual factors (complacency by operators), task factors (task repetitiveness), 
environment factors (design of landside/airside transit points), and culture factors (an 
organizational culture potentially complacent towards security doors left open). The present 
research expands the existing literature on pathways of vulnerability by exploring the most 
relevant pathways in an international airport environment. Our investigation has also supported 
Kraemer and Carayon’s illustration of the individual factors as the closest determinants for 
human error potentially leading to disruptions (2007). 
The results of this study have significant implications for the management of safe and 
secure operations in modern airports. Our findings highlight the potential impact that the airport 
(in terms of infrastructure and ensemble of organizations) can have on safety and security risks, 
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as indicated in the literature. Scholarly examples include in particular geographical location of 
airports (Jaques, 2010), infrastructural features that influence the presence of safety risks 
(Wilke, Majumdar, & Ochieng, 2015), company management and regulations (Johnson & 
Holloway, 2004; Pettersen & Bjørnskau, 2015), organizational change and structure (e.g., the 
role of sub-contracts in maintenance operations) (de Gramatica, Massacci, Shim, Turhan, & 
Williams, 2016; Herrera, Nordskag, Myhre, & Halvorsen, 2009), and others.  
Besides an original recollection of pathways for safety and security risks, our 
investigation identified some transversal, recurring themes worth further exploration (the sub-
categories of the MeA factors). An example is the implementation of a low-cost business model 
by some traditional airlines, besides the low-cost carriers. The case study revealed several 
potentially pertinent safety and security performance issues related to this business model. For 
example, from the data emerged themes related to tight or under-staffing and the use of 
complex contractual arrangements in outsourcing various functions to contractors. While 
common, these actions potentially expose airports to vulnerability as it becomes more difficult 
to ensure tight controls across the functions. As identified in a separate theme, these structural 
or resource-based issues potentially have a flow-on effect reflected by concern in ensuring that 
contractors had received the required and adequate training. Analysis of the data further 
revealed a theme related to time pressure and efficiency reflecting the cost of operations in 
airports. Indeed, high levels of pressure and time constraints are consistently demonstrated 
antecedents of accidents and errors in the workplace and airports via increased stress and 
frustration (Janic, 2000). Overall, these findings highlight the need for airport operators to 
develop protocols and systems that take account of the way airlines are increasingly organizing 
their business. Airport management is clearly required to balance multiple sources of 
vulnerability as it seeks to ensure compliance with safety and security regulations.  
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Understanding the dynamics that characterize the incubation, development and 
manifestation of organizational vulnerability is the basis for producing diagnostic frameworks 
for assessment of pathways of vulnerability in airports. Such frameworks can be used to 
conduct audits on airport operations. For training purposes, the contents of these audits can be 
shared within airport organizations. This is expected to raise operators and supervisors’ 
awareness around the potential consequences that their actions, as well as the practices, 
attitudes, and behaviors executed in their organizations, can have in terms of safe and secure 
operations. The graphic representation in which the pathways of vulnerability have been 
depicted (Fig. 2) was inspired by the accident causation models present in the literature 
(Salmon, Cornelissen, & Trotter, 2012; Underwood & Waterson, 2014). Grid-type of 
representations of accident causation can be fruitfully utilized to map the MeA factors for 
organizational vulnerability in sociotechnical systems. 
The present research has also highlighted that the pathways themselves are not a 
condition sufficient to make safety and security risks real. Triggering events such as human 
errors or criminal intentions have to occur in order to lead to an actual disturbance in the airport 
system. In this last case, latent pathways are exposed after the event has occurred, making 
prevention efforts useless. In order to further investigate the dynamics of pathways of 
vulnerability, we recommend complementing our approach with a hazard-dependent 
perspective which focuses on the nature of triggering events. 
This study suggests that the MeA could be an appropriate model to use at international 
airports when conducting internal audits aimed at improving their safety and security systems 
as it could provide a/another useful lens from which to understand vulnerability. By so doing, 
airport organizations may be better able to proactively tackle the weaknesses that exist in their 
individual and managerial practices, attitudes, and behaviors. An assessment of the airports’ 
environment against the 10 MeA categories could enable safety and security managers in 
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airports to more holistically scan their work systems without neglecting any sub-system. This 
could eventually allow the adoption of proactive measures to prevent or mitigate safety and 
security risks. 
The absence of specific patterns in the identification of safety or security risks within the 
four units of analysis (LL, CML, OML, and SSP/AFP) supports the notion that the interviewed 
airport managers had a systemic vision of their working environment in terms of safety and 
security performance. Regardless of their hierarchical level, they displayed knowledge of the 
airport system and avoided focusing exclusively on their area of competence. A general 
manager could discuss very operational events and vice versa an operational manager could 
perceive very systemic disturbances to be relevant. Further research is suggested in this area, 
but a preliminary consideration can be drawn from the present research: airport management 
in Australia enforces a culture of engagement to safety and security at all hierarchical levels of 
the explored airport organizations. 
The present paper has emphasized that a common framework to conduct risk assessment 
is not applied in the explored airports. In aviation, dissimilarities in the assessment of risk 
likelihood and risk consequences (and therefore also in the resulting risk rating) are expected 
and understandable. One could question that the different categories of likelihood and 
consequences have different definitions due to the diverse size of the airports, in terms of 
passengers, aircraft movements, revenues, etc. Based on this, in larger airports risks could be 
more likely, due to the increased number of movements and passengers3. At the same time, 
their consequences could be more relevant due to the higher economic value. Thus, a major 
event in Airport X may correspond to a minor event in Airport Z, and so on. For example, an 
airport surrounded by forests or other natural features is expected to have a different assessment 
                                                          
3 Yet, this argument is true only in theory. Findings from this study highlight that the classification of likelihood 
does not follow this pattern and the very same event is not considered more likely in the biggest airport than in 
the smallest one. 
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of bird strike risks than an urban airport. Similarly, estimated consequences of a runway 
incursion in a busy international airport are supposed to be naturally different from those in a 
small regional aerodrome.  
However, differences in risk assessment should be limited to estimates of likelihood and 
consequences and not also include the criteria against which this assessment is conducted. The 
introduction in the definition of likelihood and consequences of a weighting coefficient based 
on the airport category would maintain the individual characteristics of airports (size, revenues, 
movements, etc.) by nonetheless preserving comparability of risk assessment frameworks 
among the different airports. In general, the limitations of risk assessment frameworks (e.g., 
matrices, landscapes) have been discussed in the literature, to the point that Aven and Cox 
(2016) suggest that these tools should not be used for risk policy planning and resource 
allocation. Our study confirms this stance. However, we consider common risk assessment 
frameworks as the starting point to at least facilitate the sharing of best practices among 
airports. Airports need to come to agreed definitions of risk likelihood and risk consequences¸ 
so that risk ratings and intervention strategies are consistent throughout a country. A second, 
more ambitious step would be the elaboration of common risk entries organized around similar 
macro-categories of risks. In this way, a specific risk would have the same name and 
characteristics in all airports, which would improve comparability and information sharing.  
5.1. Synthesis of practical contributions of the study 
While in its infancy, the framework proposed in the present paper can be further tested 
(e.g., with quantitative methods or in other countries than Australia), with a view to being 
applied in airports. Despite this infancy, the findings of this paper have potential for practical 
application in a number of ways. First, the results promote the need to classify the most relevant 
safety and security risks for airports, and provide guidance to do so. Second, this paper supports 
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the utilization of the MeA as a blueprint to scan the organizational environment and flag, from 
the safety and security risks, the potential determinants of vulnerability across the 10 MeA 
categories. This approach can be utilized to conduct internal and/or external safety and security 
audits, possibly involving staff from different airports to leverage outsiders’ perspective. Third, 
this method facilitates the development of hypotheses relating to pathways of vulnerability, by 
establishing connections among the identified determinants (e.g., if it is proved that task 
repetitiveness is a determinant of complacency in safety and security operators, the former can 
be associated with an increased potential for airside breaches). Furthermore, strategies and 
interventions to mitigate vulnerability can be developed by prioritizing the pathways of 
vulnerability that seem more likely and potentially more impactful. 
As a final caveat, an agreed risk assessment framework across airports is a fundamental 
condition for testing the proposed framework across multiple airports. This requires 
establishment of common definitions of likelihood and consequences, common numerical 
standards for assessment, common definitions of risks, and common risk categories (see 
Section 4.2), as suggested in prior literature (Aven & Cox, 2016). 
5.2. Limitations and future research 
This research has some methodological limitations. As a qualitative study on safety and 
security risk perceptions, our research investigated airport risks as perceived, and described, 
by interviewees. This was necessary as Australian aviation has yet to record significant safety 
and security events, which is undeniably positive from an operational perspective, but also 
dramatically reduces available data to build a standardised method for the analysis of 
sociotechnical risk factors.  Our study constitutes an exploratory attempt (Babbie, 2013) to cast 
light on the determinants of organizational vulnerability, towards establishing an epidemiology 
of safety and security risks in airports. We recommend therefore further sociotechnical 
investigation to further validate the findings from our investigation. Furthermore, our scope of 
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investigation was limited to organizational factors internal to the explored airports, with 
environmental factors only marginally assessed by the adopted framework. This last point does 
not diminish the relevance that surrounding economic, social, legal and political influences can 
have on the formation of pathways of vulnerability. An additional limitation of this exploration 
resides in the confidential nature of the collected data. This circumscribed the amount of 
information that could be used, namely respondents’ personal data (e.g., job title, degree of 
experience, etc.). Lastly, our exploration focused on the perspective of airport management, a 
limitation in our study. Further research is necessary to gauge risk perceptions from the 
viewpoint of other fundamental players in the airport environment: airlines, retailers, travelers 
and general public.   
The present research builds on the scarce academic literature on the vulnerability of 
modern airports. We believe that further studies are necessary in this area. A plausible avenue 
for investigation is an integrated approach between vulnerability assessment and resilience 
building. The ultimate goal of the present, and other, studies on sociotechnical systems is the 
reduction of their vulnerability to service disruptions. Vulnerability reduction leads to reduced 
likelihood and/or consequences of disruptions and increased resilience (Sheffi & Rice Jr, 
2005). This integrated vulnerability-resilience field of research has been extensively 
investigated in the domain of supply chain management (Kim, Chen, & Linderman, 2015; 
Sheffi, 2015; Sheffi & Rice Jr, 2005; Speier, Whipple, Closs, & Voss, 2011) which can teach 
significant lessons to aviation management. The concept of detection lead time (the latency 
between the acknowledgement of a disruptive event and its first impact; (Sheffi, 2015)) 
suggests aviation risk managers to not focus only on mitigating the consequences of an event 
or operating to reduce its probability, but also to improve organizational capabilities to ‘sense’ 
early warnings of an impending disruption. Digital technologies are indicated as a powerful 
instrument to improve early detection of disruptive events, and reduce vulnerability together 
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with increasing resilience, by building organic capabilities to sense threats and respond quickly. 
This has been investigated in a range of domains and practical examples include financial risk 
(Koyuncugil & Ozgulbas, 2010), emergency management (Pohl, Bouchachia, & Hellwagner, 
2015), terrorism (Drozdova & Samoilov, 2010), and natural hazards (Asimakopoulou, 2010). 
Despite their role, digital technologies should not be regarded as the ultimate solution to 
anticipate crises in airports. Adopting this stance would entail supporting the classic aviation 
safety and security models which consider airports as mass production organizations where 
human behaviors follow rational and logical pathways (Kirschenbaum, 2015). Technology and 
logistics are the crucial components of aviation facilities designed based on the aforementioned 
approach, a mass processing engineering perspective (Horonjeff, 2010), which neglects that 
airports are made of complex and interdependent groups of decision-makers (Remawi, Bates, 
& Dix, 2011).   
The reality of human behavior indicates that safety and security decision-making in 
airports must take into account the human factor. This supports the argument that airport 
decision-making cannot be reduced to a ‘simple-man-machine single-individual interaction’ 
(Kirschenbaum, 2015, p. 35). 
6. CONCLUSION 
 Despite its relevance, the field of vulnerability of global aviation networks to safety and 
security risks lacks a structured, holistic body of knowledge that goes beyond ad hoc studies 
conducted in the aftermath of extreme events. The present investigation on the pathways of 
vulnerability that have the potential, in international airports, to generate safety and security 
risks is one of the first attempts to build such body of knowledge. We adopted a hazard-
independent perspective that allowed us to focus on the organizational features of the explored 
airports and assess potential determinants for both safety and security disruptions. Our research 
supports and expands the theory on pathways of vulnerability and provides practical 
suggestions for aviation practitioners to improve their early detection capabilities. 
 
32 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This research was a part of the work undertaken by the project “Airports of the Future” 
(LP0990135), a multi-disciplinary international collaborative research project exploring the 
complexity of modern airports and addressing conflicts between aviation security and the 
passenger experience, funded by the Australian Research Council Linkage Project scheme. The 
project was carried out during Ivano Bongiovanni’s appointment with the School of 
Management, Queensland University of Technology (Brisbane, QLD, Australia). The authors 
would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their precious feedback on the paper. 
  
 
33 
 
REFERENCES 
Asimakopoulou, E. (2010). Advanced ICTs for Disaster Management and Threat Detection: 
Collaborative and Distributed Frameworks: Collaborative and Distributed Frameworks. 
Hershey, NY: IGI Global. 
Aven, T., & Cox, L. A. (2016). National and Global Risk Studies: How Can the Field of Risk Analysis 
Contribute? Risk Analysis, 36(2), 186-190. doi: 10.1111/risa.12584 
Babbie, E. R. (2013). The practice of social research (13th ed.). Belmont, Cal: Wadsworth - Cengage 
Learning. 
Bouchon, S. (2006). The Vulnerability of interdependent Critical Infrastructures Systems: 
Epistemological and Conceptual State of the Art (pp. 99).  Retrieved from 
http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/the-vulnerability-of-interdependent-critical-infrastructures-
systems-pbLBNA22205/  
Boyer, K. K., & Pronovost, P. (2010). What medicine can teach operations: What operations can 
teach medicine. Journal of Operations Management, 28(5), 367-371. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jom.2010.08.002 
Carayon, P., Schoofs Hundt, A., Karsh, B. T., Gurses, A. P., Alvarado, C. J., Smith, M. J., & Flatley 
Brennan, P. (2006). Work system design for patient safety: the SEIPS model. Quality and 
Safety in Health Care, 15(suppl 1), i50-i58. doi: 10.1136/qshc.2005.015842 
Carayon, P., & Smith, M. J. (2000). Work organization and ergonomics. Applied Ergonomics, 31(6), 
649-662. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0003-6870(00)00040-5 
de Gramatica, M., Massacci, F., Shim, W., Turhan, U., & Williams, J. (2016). Agency Problems and 
Airport Security: Quantitative and Qualitative Evidence on the Impact of Security Training: 
Agency Problems and Airport Security. Risk Analysis, n/a-n/a. doi: 10.1111/risa.12607 
Dow, K. (1992). Exploring Differences in Our Common Future(S) - the Meaning of Vulnerability to 
Global Environmental-Change. Geoforum, 23(3), 417-436. doi: 10.1016/0016-
7185(92)90052-6 
Drennan, L. T., McConnell, A., & Stark, A. (2014). Risk and crisis management in the public sector: 
Routledge. 
Drozdova, K., & Samoilov, M. (2010). Predictive analysis of concealed social network activities based 
on communication technology choices: early-warning detection of attack signals from 
terrorist organizations. Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, 16(1), 61-88.  
England, J., Agarwal, J., & Blockley, D. (2008). The vulnerability of structures to unforeseen events. 
Computers & Structures, 86(10), 1042-1051. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.compstruc.2007.05.039 
Füssel, H.-M. (2007). Vulnerability: a generally applicable conceptual framework for climate change 
research. Global Environmental Change, 17(2), 155-167.  
Hendrick, H. W. (1998). Macroergonomics: A Systems Approach for Dramatically Improving 
Occupational Health, Safety and Productivity. Paper presented at the Advances in 
Occupational Ergonomics and Safety: Proceedings of the XIIIth Annual International 
Occupational Ergonomics and Safety Conference 1998. 
Hendrick, H. W., & Kleiner, B. M. (2001). Macroergonomics: an introduction to work system design. 
Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society. 
Hendrick, H. W., & Kleiner, B. M. (2002). Macroergonomics: theory, methods, and applications. 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Herrera, I. A., Nordskag, A. O., Myhre, G., & Halvorsen, K. (2009). Aviation safety and maintenance 
under major organizational changes, investigating non-existing accidents. Accident Analysis 
and Prevention, 41(6), 1155-1163. doi: 10.1016/j.aap.2008.06.007 
Horonjeff, R. (2010). Planning and design of airports (Vol. 5th). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
International Air Transport Association. (2014). New IATA Passenger Forecast Reveals Fast-Growing 
Markets of the Future.   Retrieved September 6th, 2016, from 
http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/Pages/2014-10-16-01.aspx 
 
34 
 
Janic, M. (2000). An assessment of risk and safety in civil aviation. Journal of Air Transport 
Management, 6(1), 43-50. doi: 10.1016/S0969-6997(99)00021-6 
Jaques, T. (2010). Embedding issue management as a strategic element of crisis prevention. Disaster 
Prevention and Management, 19(4), 469-482. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09653561011070385 
Johnson, C. W., & Holloway, C. M. (2004, 2004). Distribution of Causes in Selected US Aviation 
Accident Reports Between 1996 and 2003. Paper presented at the 22nd International System 
Safety Conference, Providence, RI. 
Kim, Y., Chen, Y.-S., & Linderman, K. (2015). Supply network disruption and resilience: A network 
structural perspective. Journal of Operations Management, 33, 43-59.  
Kirschenbaum, A. A. (2015). The social foundations of airport security. Journal of Air Transport 
Management, 48, 34-41.  
Knox, H., O'Doherty, D., Vurdubakis, T., & Westrup, C. (2008). Enacting Airports: Space, Movement 
and Modes of Ordering. Organization, 15(6), 869-888. doi: 10.1177/1350508408095818 
Koyuncugil, A. S., & Ozgulbas, N. (2010). Surveillance Technologies and Early Warning Systems: Data 
Mining Applications for Risk Detection: Data Mining Applications for Risk Detection. Hershey, 
NY: IGI Global. 
Kraemer, S., & Carayon, P. (2007). Human errors and violations in computer and information 
security: The viewpoint of network administrators and security specialists. Applied 
Ergonomics, 38(2), 143-154. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apergo.2006.03.010 
Kraemer, S., Carayon, P., & Clem, J. (2009). Human and organizational factors in computer and 
information security: Pathways to vulnerabilities. Computers & Security, 28(7), 509-520. doi: 
10.1016/j.cose.2009.04.006 
Lalonde, C., & Roux-Dufort, C. (2010). Crisis Management in Institutional Healthcare Settings: From 
punitive to emancipatory solutions. Organization Development Journal, 28(1), 19-36.  
Landis, J. R., & Koch, G. G. (1977). An Application of Hierarchical Kappa-type Statistics in the 
Assessment of Majority Agreement among Multiple Observers. Biometrics, 33(2), 363-374. 
doi: 10.2307/2529786 
Lewis, J. (1999). Development in disaster-prone places: studies of vulnerability. London: Intermediate 
Technology. 
Li, S., & Xu, X. (2015). Vulnerability analysis for airport networks based on fuzzy soft sets: From the 
structural and functional perspective. Chinese Journal of Aeronautics, 28(3), 780-788. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cja.2015.04.002 
Lopez, A. (2016). Vulnerability of Airports on Climate Change: An Assessment Methodology. 
Transportation Research Procedia, 14, 24-31. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.trpro.2016.05.037 
Lord, S., Nunes-Vaz, R., Filinkov, A., & Crane, G. (2010). Airport front-of-house vulnerabilities and 
mitigation options. Journal of Transportation Security, 3(3), 149-177.  
Marshall, C., & Rossman, G. B. (2011). Designing qualitative research (5th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications. 
McEntire, D. (2001). Triggering agents, vulnerabilities and disaster reduction: towards a holistic 
paradigm. Disaster Prevention and Management, 10(3), 189-196. doi: 
10.1108/09653560110395359 
McEntire, D. (2004). Tenets of vulnerability: an assessment of a fundamental disaster concept. 
Journal of Emergency Management, 2(2), 23-29.  
McEntire, D., Gilmore Crocker, C., & Peters, E. (2010). Addressing vulnerability through an integrated 
approach. International Journal of Disaster Resilience in the Built Environment, 1(1), 50-64. 
doi: 10.1108/17595901011026472 
Murphy, L. A., Robertson, M. M., & Carayon, P. (2014). The next generation of macroergonomics: 
Integrating safety climate. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 68, 16-24. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2013.11.011 
 
35 
 
Nash, J. M., Agnew, R., Ward, S., Massey, R., Callister, T., Mcneill, R., . . . Tolton, E. (2012). Guidebook 
for Airport Irregular Operations (IROPS) Contingency Planning (Vol. 65). Washington, DC: 
Airport Cooperative Research Program. 
Netjasov, F., & Janic, M. (2008). A review of research on risk and safety modelling in civil aviation. 
Journal of Air Transport Management, 14(4), 213-220. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jairtraman.2008.04.008 
Patton, M. Q. (2002). Qualitative research and evaluation methods (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications. 
Pettersen, K. A., & Bjørnskau, T. (2015). Organizational contradictions between safety and security – 
Perceived challenges and ways of integrating critical infrastructure protection in civil 
aviation. Safety Science, 71, 167-177. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2014.04.018 
Pohl, D., Bouchachia, A., & Hellwagner, H. (2015). Social media for crisis management: clustering 
approaches for sub-event detection. Multimedia Tools and Applications, 74(11), 3901-3932.  
Punch, S. (2012). Hidden struggles of fieldwork: Exploring the role and use of field diaries. Emotion, 
Space and Society, 5(2), 86-93. doi: 10.1016/j.emospa.2010.09.005 
Reason, J. T. (1990). Human error. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Remawi, H., Bates, P., & Dix, I. (2011). The relationship between the implementation of a Safety 
Management System and the attitudes of employees towards unsafe acts in aviation. Safety 
Science, 49(5), 625-632.  
Salmon, P. M., Cornelissen, M., & Trotter, M. J. (2012). Systems-based accident analysis methods: A 
comparison of Accimap, HFACS, and STAMP. Safety Science, 50(4), 1158-1170. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2011.11.009 
Shafieezadeh, A., Cha, E., & Ellingwood, B. (2015). A Decision Framework for Managing Risk to 
Airports from Terrorist Attack. Risk Analysis, 35(2), 292-306. doi: 10.1111/risa.12266 
Sheffi, Y. (2015). Preparing for disruptions through early detection. MIT Sloan management review, 
57(1), 31.  
Sheffi, Y., & Rice Jr, J. B. (2005). A supply chain view of the resilient enterprise. MIT Sloan 
management review, 47(1), 41.  
Smith, D. (1990a). Beyond contingency planning: Towards a model of crisis management. 
Organization & Environment, 4(4), 263-275.  
Smith, D. (1990b). Corporate power and the politics of uncertainty: risk management at the Canvey 
Island complex. Industrial Crisis Quarterly, 4(1), 1-26.  
Smith, D. (1995). The dark side of excellence: managing strategic failures. In J. Thompson (Ed.), 
Handbook of strategic management (pp. 161-191). Oxford, UK: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Smith, D. (2000). On a wing and a prayer? Exploring the human components of technological failure. 
Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 17(6), 543-559.  
Smith, D. (2004). For Whom the Bell Tolls: Imagining Accidents and the Development of Crisis 
Simulation in Organizations. Simulation & Gaming, 35(3), 347-362. doi: 
10.1177/1046878104266295 
Smith, D. (2005). Business (not) as usual: crisis management, service recovery and the vulnerability 
of organisations. Journal of Services Marketing, 19(5), 309-320. doi: 
10.1108/08876040510609925 
Speier, C., Whipple, J. M., Closs, D. J., & Voss, M. D. (2011). Global supply chain design 
considerations: Mitigating product safety and security risks. Journal of Operations 
Management, 29(7), 721-736.  
Stave, K. A., & Kopainsky, B. (2015). A system dynamics approach for examining mechanisms and 
pathways of food supply vulnerability. Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences, 5(3), 
321-336. doi: 10.1007/s13412-015-0289-x 
Stewart, M., & Mueller, J. (2013). Terrorism Risks and Cost-Benefit Analysis of Aviation Security. Risk 
Analysis, 33(5), 893-908. doi: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2012.01905.x 
 
36 
 
Stewart, M., & Mueller, J. (2014). A risk and cost–benefit analysis of police counter-terrorism 
operations at Australian airports. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 
9(2), 98-116. doi: 10.1080/18335330.2014.940816 
Tran, Q. H. A., & Namatame, A. (2015). Worldwide aviation network vulnerability analysis: a complex 
network approach. Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, 12(2), 349-373. doi: 
10.1007/s40844-015-0025-y 
Turner, B. A. (1976). The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 21(3), 378. doi: 10.2307/2391850 
Turner, B. A., & Pidgeon, N. F. (1978). Man-made disasters. London: Wykeham Publications. 
Underwood, P., & Waterson, P. (2014). Systems thinking, the Swiss Cheese Model and accident 
analysis: A comparative systemic analysis of the Grayrigg train derailment using the ATSB, 
AcciMap and STAMP models. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 68, 75-94. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2013.07.027 
White, G. F. (1974). Natural hazards, local, national, global. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Wilke, S., Majumdar, A., & Ochieng, W. Y. (2015). The impact of airport characteristics on airport 
surface accidents and incidents. Journal of Safety Research, 53, 63-75. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jsr.2015.03.006 
 
 
